







Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
For several reasons, it is important that
Federal Reserve policymakers have a good un-
derstanding of the relationship between money
growth, interest rates, and spending. For ex-
ample, the Federal Reserve is legally obligated
to provide Congress with annual money growth
projections. Federal Reserve officials must be
prepared to explain the basis for these projec-
tions and to interpret deviations of actual money
growth from past forecasts. Moreover, several
studies have suggested that there is information
on future spending and future inflation in the
difference between the current money supply
and the long-run demand for money (Hallman,
Porter, and Small 1991; Feldstein and Stock 1993;
Koenig 1994; Duca 1994). Successful extraction
of this information requires that the long-run
demand for money be accurately estimated.
Unfortunately, many models have system-
atically overpredicted money growth during
the 1990s—often by very large amounts. The
forecasting record of DRI/McGraw-Hill (DRI) is
typical. Figure 1 shows actual annualized M2
growth from 1990 through 1994, along with the
M2 growth forecasts published by DRI each
January. In every quarter over this five-year
period, DRI overpredicted M2 growth. The
average error was over 3 percentage points.
The M2 model developed in the late 1980s
by the staff of the Federal Reserve Board also
overpredicted money growth.1 In 1993, citing
increased uncertainty in the relationship be-
tween M2 and spending, the Federal Open
Market Committee announced that it would
de-emphasize M2 in the policy-making process
(Greenspan 1993).
Recent efforts to explain the unexpectedly
weak M2 growth of the early 1990s have fo-
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T he focus of earlier work was on
developing an empirical model
capable of reproducing the recent
pattern of money growth. This article
examines whether by substituting
real-time forecasts of spending growth
and interest rates into the model, it
can be successfully used to predict
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cused on two fundamental underlying causes:
(1) a deterioration in the competitiveness of
banks and savings and loans resulting from
tighter regulation, higher deposit insurance pre-
miums, and more stringent capital standards
and (2) financial innovations that have made
nonbank assets like stocks and bonds increas-
ingly attractive to households.2 Koenig (1996)
argues that insofar as banks have become less
competitive, their higher costs ought to be re-
flected in an increase in the spread between
the yield on stocks and bonds and the yield
on bank deposits. If existing measures of
money’s opportunity cost fail to show an in-
crease in this spread, it may be necessary to
revise those measures. In particular, empirical
results suggest that one should allow long-
term bond rates to play a role in determining
money’s opportunity cost. Moreover, Koenig
argues that whereas many of the important
financial innovations of the early 1980s (such
as the introduction of money market deposit
accounts) were a result of sudden, discrete
changes in the law, recent financial innovation
can best be modeled as a continuous, ongoing
process. Consistent with this point of view,
Koenig reports evidence—even in early sample
periods—of a gradual acceleration in M2’s
velocity growth. An M2 model that allows
long-term bond rates to affect M2’s opportunity
cost and that allows a gradual acceleration in
M2’s velocity growth does not exhibit a sta-
tistically significant money-growth shortfall in
the early 1990s. The recent performance of
the model is somewhat further improved if the
definition of money is expanded to include
household bond market mutual funds, as advo-
cated by Duca (1994, 1995).
The focus of my earlier work was on de-
veloping an empirical model capable of repro-
ducing the recent pattern of money growth.
This article examines whether by substituting
real-time forecasts of spending growth and in-
terest rates into the model, it can be successfully
used to predict changes in money growth.3 The
spending and interest rate forecasts in question
are obtained from DRI reports published each
January. Results of the exercise have generally
been encouraging. However, in 1995 a sharp
flattening of the yield curve led to a more pro-
nounced than expected acceleration of money
growth. Consequently, the future usefulness of
the model remains an open question.
This article begins with a review of the
M2 growth model developed in my earlier
article. Next, I examine the accuracy of DRI
forecasts of spending and interest rates. Finally,
I use DRI spending and interest rate predictions
from January of each year to obtain ex ante
forecasts of M2 growth. A similar exercise is
undertaken for M2 expanded to include house-
hold bond funds. Results for the latter monetary
aggregate are generally similar to those for con-
ventional M2. Although the expanded aggre-
gate is somewhat easier to predict through
1994, preliminary data suggest that 1995 errors
are even larger than those recorded using con-
ventional M2.
The model
This section makes two points.4 First, even
in early sample periods, there is evidence both
that long-term interest rates help explain the
pattern of money growth and that money
growth has been gradually decelerating relative
to spending growth. Second, a model that incor-
porates these effects does a satisfactory job of
reproducing the pattern of M2 growth observed
during the first half of the 1990s.
Description. The M2 growth model used
in this article has two main components—a
long-run equilibrium condition and short-run
dynamics. The long-run equilibrium condition
is a money-demand relationship of the form
(1) m*t = τt – a3oct + xt,
where m* denotes the logarithm of the long-run
equilibrium demand for nominal M2 balances,
x is the logarithm of nominal nondurables and
services consumption expenditures, oc is the
logarithm of M2’s opportunity cost (defined
below), and a3 is a non-negative parameter. A
deterministic time trend, τ, is included as a
right-hand-side variable in equation 1, as a proxy
for the effects of financial innovation on the
long-run demand for money. Specifically, it is
assumed that
(2) τt = a0 + a0′DMMDAt – a1t – a2t 2,
where DMMDA is a dummy variable that equals
1 after the introduction of money market de-
posit accounts (MMDAs) and zero otherwise.5
If financial innovation has been accelerating,
one would expect to find a2 > 0.
In the short run, money growth is assumed
to be greater the greater the gap is between the
long-run demand for money balances and the
current level of money balances. Money growth
also depends upon lagged values of itself, cur-
rent and lagged values of consumption spend-
ing, and current and lagged changes in money’s
opportunity cost:18
(3) ∆mt = φt + c1D83Q1 + c2D83Q2
+ c3DCON + c4(m* – m)t–1
+ c5∆oct + c5A∆oct–1 + c6∆xt
+ c6A∆xt–1 + c6B∆xt–2 + c7∆mt–1.
Here, φt is a time trend and
D83Q1 ≡ dummy equal to 1 in 1983:1
to control for MMDAs,
D83Q2 ≡ dummy equal to 1 in 1983:2
to control for MMDAs, and
DCON ≡ 1 in 1980:2 when credit controls
were imposed and
–1 in 1980:3 after credit controls
were lifted.
The (logarithm of the) long-run demand for
money, m*, is given by equation 1.
The opportunity cost of holding money is
defined to be a weighted average of long-term
and short-term bond rates less the average re-
turn on M2 deposits. Thus,
(4) oct = ln[θR10Yt + (1 – θ)R3Mt – RM2t ],
where R10Yt, R3Mt, and RM2t are the rates of
return on ten-year Treasury bonds, three-month
Treasury bills, and M2 deposits, respectively,
and where the weighting coefficient, θ, is esti-
mated along with the other parameters of the
model. Including a long-term bond rate in the
opportunity cost formula allows for the possi-
bility that households regard long-term non-
intermediated securities as substitutes for some
monetary assets. Theoretical arguments favor-
ing this approach are developed by Orr (1970),
Friedman (1977), and Poole (1988). Empirical
support has come from Hamburger (1966,
1977, 1983) and, more recently, Feinman and
Porter (1992).
As shown in the appendix, the time trends
in equations 1 and 3 are not independent. If
actual money growth is to have the same uncon-
ditional mean as growth in the long-run demand
for money, then the time trend in equation 3
must take the form
(5) φt = c0 – 2a2 [t – c7 (t – 1)] ,
where c0 is a fixed parameter. Hence, equation 3
can be rewritten as
(3′) ∆mt = c0 – 2a2t + c1D83Q1 + c2D83Q2
+ c3DCON + c4(m* – m)t–1
+ c5∆oct + c5A∆oct–1 + c6∆xt
+ c6A∆xt–1 + c6B∆xt–2
+ c7[∆mt–1+ 2a2 (t – 1)] .
Intuitively, insofar as a2 is greater than zero,
equations 1 and 2 imply that long-run trend
growth in desired money balances will gradu-
ally fall relative to growth in spending. If actual
money growth is, on average, to equal desired
money growth, then actual money growth must
also gradually slow for any given rate of spend-
ing growth.
Estimation results. Equations 1, 2, and 4
were substituted into 3′, and the resultant
equation was estimated using nonlinear least
squares.6 Results are presented in Table 1. Col-
umn 1 of the table reports results for a sample
Table 1
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Q (4) 6.43 5.05
Q (12) 16.81 13.83
Q (20) 25.36 25.81
SSE .00127 .00142
SEE .00380 .00363
Adjusted R 2 .782 .849
* Significant at 5-percent level.
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period ending in the fourth quarter of 1989,
when M2 was near the height of its popularity
as an indicator of the stance of monetary policy
and the future direction of the economy. Col-
umn 2 extends the sample period through
1994:4, by which time the breakdown of the
Federal Reserve Board’s money-growth model
was evident.
Note, first, that the weight attached to the
long-term bond rate in the opportunity cost
formula (θ in equation 4) is statistically and
economically significant even in the sample end-
ing prior to the recent period of “missing money.”
There is also evidence of an acceleration in
velocity growth in the early sample: the estimate
of the parameter a2 in column 1 of Table 1
implies that annualized money growth falls
by about 13 hundredths of a percentage point
per year relative to spending growth, all else
constant.7
Note, second, that the model developed
above exhibits relatively few symptoms of in-
stability. Thus, parameter drift is limited: the
estimates in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 are
generally within one standard error of each
other, and in no case does the difference exceed
two standard errors.8 Moreover, the adjusted R 2
of the model rises from 0.78 to 0.85 as the
sample is extended, and the model’s standard
error falls from about 1.52 percentage points
(annualized) in the early sample to 1.45 per-
centage points (annualized) in the later sample.
Figures 2 and 3 provide perspective. To
construct Figure 2, parameter estimates from
column 1 of Table 1 were combined with
actual values of right-hand-side variables (in-
cluding actual lagged money and actual lagged
money growth) to generate simulated values of
money growth from 1990 through 1994. These
simulated values are plotted along with actual
money growth and two-standard-error bands.
The figure shows that although the model
consistently predicts more rapid money growth
than was actually observed, with but one ex-
ception (1993:1), the errors are not statistically
significant.
Figure 3 presents results from several
dynamic simulation exercises. To generate the
plot labeled baseline M2 demand model,
parameter estimates were taken from column 1
of Table 1. Actual values of nonmonetary right-
hand-side variables were substituted into the
estimated equations, along with lagged pre-
dicted (not actual) values of money and money
growth. In fourth-quarter 1994, five years after
the beginning of the simulation, the gap be-
tween the actual and predicted levels of M2 is
only 3.1 percent.
Two other simulated paths are also pre-
sented in Figure 3. To generate these paths,
the baseline model was reestimated with, first,
the long-term bond rate and, second, with both
the long-term bond rate and the quadratic trend
excluded. Note how poorly the restricted mod-
els do in comparison with the baseline model:
in the model without the long-term bond rate,
the gap between the actual and predicted levels
of M2 is nearly 9 percent at the end of the
simulation period; in the model without both
the long-term bond rate and the quadratic time
trend, the corresponding gap is over 18 percent!
Bond-fund-adjusted M2. The weakness in
M2 growth during the early 1990s was associ-
ated with large flows out of certificates of de-
posit (CDs) and large flows into bond market
mutual funds (BMMFs). Duca (1995, 1994) has
suggested that the definition of money be ex-
Figure 2
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panded to include household bond market
mutual fund balances, thus internalizing substi-
tution between CDs and BMMFs. Despite this
internalization, when the model developed
above is reestimated using Duca’s bond-fund-
adjusted M2 (M2B) in place of conventional M2,
the point estimates of the weight attached to
the long-term bond rate in equation 4 and of
the coefficient of time squared in equation 2
are virtually unchanged (Koenig 1996). As illus-
trated in Figures 4 and 5 (which are the M2B
analogs of Figures 2 and 3), the out-of-sample
stability of the model is somewhat better using
M2B than using M2.9 However, the choice of
monetary aggregate is of second-order im-
portance compared with the choice of whether
to allow long-term interest rates to affect money’s
opportunity cost and whether to allow for a
gradual slowing of trend money growth relative
to trend spending growth. In Figure 5, for ex-
ample, including long-term interest rates and a
quadratic time trend in the M2B model reduces
the end-of-1994 gap between the actual and
predicted levels of money by 14.6 percentage
points—from 16.2 percent to 1.6 percent. By
comparison, using M2B in place of M2 in the
forecasting model causes the end-of-1994 gap
between the actual and predicted levels of money
to decline by only 1.5 percentage points.
Real-time forecasting
In this section, I take spending and interest
rate forecasts published by DRI each January
from 1990 through 1995 and find the implied
time paths of M2 and M2B, as predicted by the
money-growth model described above. The aim
is to find out how accurately the model would
have predicted money growth in each of the
past six years, given DRI’s spending and interest
rate forecasts. The model does a good job of
predicting M2 growth through 1994, provided
coefficients are periodically reestimated. How-
ever, large underpredictions in 1995 raise
questions about the model’s future forecasting
performance. Results using M2B are less sensi-
tive to periodic reestimation of the model’s co-
efficients. On the other hand, preliminary data
suggest that 1995 M2B growth is underpredicted
even more dramatically than is 1995 M2 growth.
Real-time forecasts of consumption and
money’s opportunity cost. Successful real-time
forecasts of money growth depend on success-
ful real-time forecasts of spending and interest
rates. Therefore, the first step in the forecasting
analysis must be an examination of how accu-
rate DRI has been in its consumer spending
and interest rate predictions.
Figure 6 shows actual annualized growth
in nominal consumer spending on nondur-
ables and services (the solid line), along with a
series of DRI forecasts of the same variable
(dotted lines). Each year’s forecasted values are
taken from the DRI Review of the U.S. Economy
published in January of that year. In particular
quarters, the DRI forecast has been off by as
much as 2 percentage points. However, the
errors are not consistently positive or consis-
tently negative. Nor are the errors persistent:
an overestimate is as likely to be followed by
an underestimate as another overestimate.
DRI does not publish a forecast of M2’s
opportunity cost, but a forecast can be con-
structed by regressing historical opportunity cost
data on interest rate series that DRI does pre-
dict. I started with a sample period extending
from 1964 through 1989 and regressed the op-
portunity cost on a constant, three own lags, the
Figure 4
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three-month CD rate, the federal funds rate,
current and three lagged values of the three-
month T-bill rate, and current and four lagged
values of the ten-year Treasury bond rate.10
The regression has an R
—2 of 0.96, and there is no
evidence of serial correlation of the residuals.11
January 1990 DRI forecasts of the three-month
CD rate, the federal funds rate, the three-month
T-bill rate, and the ten-year T-bond rate were
substituted into the fitted equation to obtain a
predicted opportunity cost for each quarter of
1990. The whole process was repeated—using
a 1964–90 sample and January 1991 DRI
interest rate forecasts—to obtain opportunity
cost predictions for 1991. Similar predictions
were obtained for 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995.12
Actual and forecasted opportunity costs are
plotted in Figure 7.
As shown in the figure, although they are
generally small, deviations of forecasted oppor-
tunity costs from actual opportunity costs ex-
hibit considerable intrayear persistence. Thus,
DRI’s interest rate forecasts would have led one
to underpredict M2’s opportunity cost during
most of 1990 and all of 1992 and to slightly
overpredict M2’s opportunity cost during 1993.
The sharp increase in the opportunity cost dur-
ing 1994 was entirely unanticipated by DRI. In
January 1995, DRI’s interest rate forecasts im-
plied that M2 deposit rates would begin to catch
up with Treasury bill and bond rates, resulting
in a gradual decline in M2’s opportunity cost.
The actual decline was considerably more rapid.
Real-time forecasts of M2 growth. Given
DRI’s spending and interest rate forecasts, how
accurately would the money-demand model
described above have predicted M2 growth in
each of the past six years? Figure 8 provides
some insight. The figure plots actual M2 growth
along with M2 growth predictions based on
DRI spending and interest rate forecasts. In
addition, to provide a feel for how sensitive
the model’s predictive performance is to the
accuracy of DRI’s spending and interest rate
forecasts, Figure 8 includes M2 growth pre-
dictions based on actual spending and interest
rate data. In generating both sets of M2 predic-
tions, model coefficients are held fixed at values
obtained in an estimation that ends in fourth-
quarter 1989 (prior to the recent episode of
“missing money”). The forecaster is assumed to
observe actual money and money growth for
the quarter preceding each forecast year. How-
ever, within each forecast year, lagged pre-
dicted values of money and money growth—
rather than lagged actual values—are substi-
Figure 6
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tuted into equation 3′ to generate the current
quarter’s predicted change in M2. In other
words, within each year the M2 growth forecasts
are dynamic.
As might be expected, given the results
displayed in Figure 2, the model systematically
overpredicts M2 growth over most of the fore-
cast horizon. For the M2 growth forecasts based
on actual spending and interest rate data,
overpredictions are most serious over the two-
year period running from 1992:2 through 1994:1.
For the real-time M2 growth predictions based
on DRI spending and interest rate forecasts,
errors are largest in 1992 and 1994. For both sets
of M2 growth predictions, preliminary data sug-
gest that the model underpredicted money
growth during most of 1995, especially in the
second and third quarters.
Over the forecast period as a whole, an
analyst would have done about as well basing
his M2 growth predictions on DRI spending
and interest rate forecasts as on actual spending
and interest rate data. This point is documented
in Table 2. The first column gives actual fourth-
quarter over fourth-quarter M2 growth rates for
each of the years from 1990 through 1995. The
second and third columns give fourth-quarter
over fourth-quarter growth predictions that
correspond to the forecasts plotted in Figure 8.
Thus, predictions in column 2 are calculated
using actual right-hand-side (RHS) spending
and interest rate data. Predictions in column 3
are calculated using right-hand-side spending
and interest rate forecasts taken from DRI. Note
that the mean growth rates and root-mean-
square errors reported in these columns are
fairly similar. In both cases, the mean error over
the 1990–94 period is about 2 percentage
points, and the root-mean-square error is a bit
over 2 percentage points. The corresponding
figures for DRI’s own M2 growth predictions
over this period are 3.1 percentage points and
3.2 percentage points, respectively. (See Table
2, column 6.) Thus, although the forecasting
performance of the model developed above is
hardly an unqualified success, it is substantially
better than that of at least one major private
forecasting firm.
The 1990–94 predictive performance of
the baseline model can be improved by allow-
ing reestimation of the model at the beginning
of each year, to obtain updated coefficient esti-
Table 2
Forecasted Four-Quarter M2 Growth Rates
No Coefficient Updating Coefficient Updating
Actual Actual RHS DRI RHS Actual RHS DRI RHS DRI Model
1990 3.91 4.77 4.45 4.77 4.45 6.51
1991 2.83 5.11 3.32 4.67 3.12 5.60
1992 1.94 4.40 5.17 2.63 3.35 5.90
1993 1.69 4.80 3.83 2.40 1.08 3.57
1994 1.06 2.35 4.82 –.72 1.57 5.17
1995 4.08 — 2.45 — –.28 4.12
Mean* 2.29 4.29 4.32 2.75 2.71 5.35
RMSE* — 2.16 2.44 1.29 .77 3.18
Mean** 2.58 — 4.01 — 2.22 5.14
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mates. Results for this case are plotted in Figure
9. As in Figure 8, during 1992 and 1994, when
DRI interest rate forecasts would have led one
to underestimate M2’s opportunity cost, M2
growth forecasts based on DRI data are notice-
ably stronger than those based on actual data.
Nevertheless, for the forecast period as a whole,
the M2 growth forecasts based on DRI estimates
of spending and interest rates are no worse than
those based on actual spending and interest rate
data. The mean forecast error is about one-half
percentage point in either case, and the root-
mean-square error is about 1 percentage point.
(See columns 4 and 5 of Table 2.) Unfortunately,
the model with updated coefficients under-
predicts 1995 M2 growth by almost 4.4 percent-
age points. For comparison, without coefficient
updating the model underpredicts 1995 M2
growth by about 1.6 percentage points.
In summary, the biggest constraint on the
real-time predictive performance of the M2 de-
mand model developed here comes not from
the need to forecast spending and interest rates
but from instability in the coefficients of the
model. This instability—although not statis-
tically significant—limits the usefulness of the
model for forecasting purposes. On the other
hand, the results displayed in Figure 8 raise the
possibility that coefficient instability may have
been largely confined to the two-year period
from 1992:2 through 1994:1. Only time will tell
whether this conjecture is correct. In the mean-
time, the M2 growth forecasts generated by the
model described in this article must be used
with a good deal of caution.
Real-time forecasts of M2B growth. Finally,
consider how easy it would have been for an
analyst to predict M2B growth, year by year,
using the model developed here and spending
and interest rate forecasts published by DRI. As
shown in Figure 10, even without coefficient
updates the model does a good job of pre-
dicting the pattern of M2B growth through 1994.
Using actual spending and interest rate data,
the model overpredicts money growth over
much of the forecast horizon. However, the
errors are noticeably smaller than those plotted
in Figure 8. Using real-time DRI forecasts of
spending and interest rates, the largest M2B
growth overpredictions occur during 1992 and
1994—years in which DRI’s interest rate fore-
casts would have led one to underpredict M2B’s
opportunity cost.13 According to results dis-
played in columns 2 and 3 of Table 3, using DRI
spending and interest rate forecasts would not
have resulted in any significant additional bias
in predicted M2B growth but would have in-
creased the model’s root-mean-square error by
almost 50 percent (from 1.25 percentage points
to 1.82 percentage points).
Figure 11 shows the effects of allowing the
coefficients of the M2B model to be reestimated
at the start of each year. From 1990 through
1994, bias is virtually eliminated and the model
accurately traces the quarterly movements in
M2B growth—especially when actual spending
and interest rate data are used as right-hand-
side variables. As shown in columns 4 and 5 of
Table 2, it remains the case that using real-time
DRI forecasts of spending and interest rates
increases the model’s 1990–94 root-mean-
square error by about 50 percent relative to
what it would have been had accurate spending
and interest rate forecasts been available.
Unfortunately, available data suggest that
the model described in this article underpre-
dicts 1995 M2B growth even more dramatically
than it underpredicts 1995 M2 growth.14 This
Figure 10
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result is obtained regardless of whether model
coefficients are updated each year. Thus, with-
out coefficient updating the real-time 1995 M2
forecast error is 1.6 percentage points, while the
corresponding M2B forecast error is 3.4 percent-
age points. With coefficient updates, the 1995
M2 and M2B forecast errors are 4.4 percent and
5 percent, respectively. For the 1990–95 forecast
period as a whole, M2B is no easier to predict
than is conventional M2.
Concluding remarks
Understanding the relationship between
money growth, interest rates, and spending is
important to Federal Reserve policymakers.
Movements in money, properly interpreted, are
potentially valuable as indicators of current and
future spending and future inflation. Moreover,
the Federal Reserve is required by law to an-
nounce growth projections for the monetary
aggregates, and Federal Reserve officials are ex-
pected to explain deviations of actual money
growth from those projections.
Results presented here suggest that it is
important to control for movements in long-
term interest rates when explaining M2 growth
and that the pace of financial innovation has
been gradually accelerating. A money-growth
model that takes these influences into account
reproduces much (though not all) of the ob-
served weakness in M2 growth in the early
1990s, a period during which several other M2
models have broken down. Evidence that long-
term interest rates affect M2 growth and that
the pace of financial innovation is accelerating
emerges even in samples that end prior to the
recent period of M2 weakness. Nearly identical
results are obtained for an M2 aggregate ex-
panded to include household bond funds.
The money-growth model estimated in
this article can be combined with DRI fore-
casts of spending and interest rates to yield real-
time money-growth predictions. Results are
not entirely satisfactory. When its coefficients
are held fixed at 1989 levels, the model sub-
stantially overpredicts M2 growth during 1992
and 1993. When its coefficients are updated
each year, the model does well for 1990
through 1994 but badly underpredicts 1995 M2
growth. If one confines one’s attention to the
1990–94 period, coefficient instability appears
to be less of a problem when predicting the
growth rate of an M2 aggregate expanded to
include bond funds than it is when predicting
conventional M2. However, preliminary data
indicate that 1995 underpredictions are even
more serious for the expanded aggregate than
they are for M2.
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1 For a description of the Board model, see Moore,
Porter, and Small (1990). Feinman and Porter (1992)
document the breakdown of the Board model.
2 For elaboration, see Feinman and Porter (1992) and
the articles contained in the November/December
1994 issue of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’
Table 3
Predicted Four-Quarter M2B Growth Rates
No Coefficient Updating Coefficient Updating
Actual Actual RHS RHS from DRI Actual RHS RHS from DRI
1990 3.79 4.97 5.05 4.97 5.05
1991 4.19 5.92 4.22 5.32 3.91
1992 3.46 4.79 5.48 3.35 4.02
1993 3.54 4.55 3.25 2.89 1.36
1994 .00 .81 3.29 –.76 1.54
1995 4.36 — .95 — –.61
Mean* 3.00 4.21 4.26 3.15 3.18
RMSE* — 1.25 1.82 .86 1.35
Mean** 3.22 — 3.71 — 2.54
RMSE** — — 2.17 — 2.37
* 1990–94.
** 1990–95.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 25 ECONOMIC REVIEW  SECOND QUARTER 1996
Review. The earliest attempts to explain the M2 growth
slowdown focused on the impact of the savings and
loan crisis (Carlson and Parrott 1991, Duca 1993).
This line of attack was largely abandoned, however,
when slow M2 growth continued well after the thrift
crisis had wound down.
3 Recall that the Federal Reserve is legally obligated to
provide Congress with money-growth projections.
4 For a more complete discussion, see Koenig (1996).
5 A similar time trend, but with a2 = 0, is included in the
M2 growth model developed by Moore, Porter, and
Small (1990). Clearly, a time trend may adequately
proxy for financial change over one sample period
and not over others.
6 Embedding the long-run equilibrium condition within
the short-run dynamics of money growth prior to esti-
mation reduces finite-sample bias (Banerjee, Dolado,
Hendry, and Smith 1986).
7 Together, equations 1 and 2 imply that
∆m*t = ∆xt + (a2 – a1) – 2a2t ,
assuming a constant opportunity cost. Thus, the
quarterly growth rate of m* falls by 2a2 each quarter.
It follows that the annualized growth rate of m* falls by
8a2 each quarter, or 32a2 each year.
8 One of the largest changes—relative to its reported
standard error—is in the coefficient (a2) of time
squared in the long-run money-demand equation.
However, the size of this change may be more appar-
ent than real. It is well known that the estimated co-
efficients of nonstationary variables have nonstandard
distributions. The reported errors for such coefficients
are biased downward.
9 However, the model significantly underpredicts M2B
growth during the late 1980s. See Koenig (1996) for
details.
10 In calculating the opportunity cost, I used the value of
the weighting parameter, θ, obtained from estimation
of the money-demand model over a 1964–89 sample
period.
11 The test statistic is Q(26) = 26.075, with p-value 0.459.
12 The weighting parameter, θ, was revised with each
new forecast.
13 The pattern of M2B opportunity cost forecasts is similar
to the pattern of M2 opportunity cost forecasts shown
in Figure 7.
14 The 1995 M2B data displayed in Figures 10 and 11
and summarized in Table 3 are preliminary. In par-
ticular, they are not adjusted to exclude IRA and
Keogh bond-fund balances, as advocated by Duca
(1995, 1994). Data required to make the adjustment
are not yet available. However, inflows into IRA and
Keogh accounts would have to have been unrealisti-
cally large (exceeding total household bond-fund
inflows) to have a material impact on the conclusions
of this article.
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Appendix
Connecting the Time Trends in the Long-Run and Short-Run Money Equations
This appendix documents why the time trend
in equation 3′ takes the form it does. I focus on a
version of the M2 growth model that, for simplicity,
has been stripped of dummy variables. In the
stripped-down model, equation 3 takes the form
while equations 1 and 2 can be combined to yield
What form must φt take to have E(∆mt) =
E(∆m*t) for all t ? Empirically, oct is stationary.
Hence, E(∆oct) = 0. Similarly, the stationarity of ∆xt
implies that E(∆xt) = E(∆xt–1) = E(∆xt–2) ≡ E(∆x).
Taking the expectation of equation A.1 and the
expectation of the first difference of A.2 yields
and
It follows that E(∆mt) = E(∆m*t) for all t only if
where
Equation A.5 has the same form as equation 5 in
the text.
∆mt = φt +  c4(m * − m)t−1 + c5∆oct
+ c5 A∆oct−1 +  c6∆xt
+ c6 A∆xt−1 +  c6B ∆xt− 2 + c7∆mt −1,
(A.1)
m* t = a0 − a1t − a2t
2− a3oct + xt . (A.2)
(A.3) E(∆mt )= φt + (c6 +  c6 A +  c6B)E(∆x)
+ c7E(∆mt−1),
E(∆m*t ) = (a2 − a1) − 2a2t + E(∆x). (A.4)
(A.5) φt = c0 − 2a2[t − c7(t −1)],
(A.6) c0 = (a2 −  a1)(1− c7)
+ (1− c6 − c6A − c6B  − c7)E(∆x).